【主讲】陈煜 助理教授 (南京大学best365中国官方网站)

【主题】Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation

【时间】2014年11月18日 (周二) 15：30-17：00

【地点】best365中国官方网站楼602室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We examine when the centralized mechanism design can be decentralized by menu design in generalized multi-agency contracting games with Bayesian implementation. We permit "full interdependence" over the agents, including interdependent valuations, contract externalities, correlated types, and cross constraints on feasible contracts. The delegation principle for Bayesian implementation indicates that Bayesian menu design is always strategically equivalent to bilateral Bayesian mechanism design rather than collective Bayesian mechanism design. Based on it, we take advantage of Bayesian update and interim-payoff-equivalence to identify a few conditions under which which Bayesian menu design is equivalent to both bilateral Bayesian mechanism design and collective Bayesian mechanism design.